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What are media? What do they do? Are these two questions the same? And is the
process we have in mind in asking them that of mediation or of mediality?
In debating the issue, we came to realize that we are also dealing here with a
translation problem. When a German and an Israeli speak in English about media,
mediation, and mediality, it is only natural, given the different cultural and academic
contexts, that there will be differences in understanding. Whereas in German the
difference between mediation as Vermittlung and mediality as Medialität is quite clear,
this hardly is the case in English. The Anglo media discourse often uses mediation and
mediality interchangeably, and largely as related to the Aristotelian metaxy, a third
that is in-between or in medio: [a]–[M]–[b]. But in German this refers to Vermittlung:
the mediator (der Vermittler) by virtue of being in the middle mediates (vermittelt)
something to be mediated (das Vermittelte). Importantly, the task of the mediator is
tantamount to its ability to dissolve in the process, to bring things together while
receding to the background.1 In this sense, media designate the conditions for
mediation so as to put the relata in relation in the first place. Conversely, Medialität
refers to the specific structure of a specific medium, i.e., its aesthetic obstinacies,
technical operations, or semiotic significations. Thus, in English, discussion on
Medialität actually takes place under “mediation,” which in German is normally
translated as Vermittlung. However, at stake is more than conceptual inconsistencies.
The translingual comparison suggests something essential to the understating of
media.
Indeed, when attempting to dig out the conceptual assumptions underlying
mediation and mediality, we might have hit Pandora's box of media studies. First
comes out the Hegelian Geist, the mediation by which oppositions collide and
combine through the intervention of a third. This process involves rising up to a
higher order while the mediation undertaken thereby dissolves in the process. The
mediating logic of Hegelian dialectics depends for its success on incorporating and
transcending the elements to be mediated. In this sense, the Hegelian philosophy of
history can be seen as a process of mediation at the end of which comes the end of
history. Such a progressive process would also apply to a certain account of the history
1

The medium in the middle allowing for a mediation of something while receding itself, this
appearing while disappearing, has been stated already by Aristotle and has since been taken up by
the Stoics in their aesthetics of late antiquity, philosophers working on optics in the Middle Ages,
natural philosophers, classical physicists, Herder in his philosophy of language, and Hegel in his
aesthetics. With McLuhan, Kittler, and other media theorists, this dialectic has become the starting
point of recent media theory. See Aristotle, De Anima, or about the Soul, trans. Glen Coughlin
(South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2022), 418b-419b; Dieter Mersch, Medientheorien zur
Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 2006), 18-27.
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of media and of understanding media. From the box comes another presence: the
Aristotelian metaxy, the in-between, which was translated by Thomas Aquinas into
Latin as medium.2 This translation led to a tradition taken up by optics in the Middle
Ages, stretching all the way through natural philosophy, physics, romanticism, and
throughout the 20th century.3 Here the medium as a material entity mediates at the
expense of the perception of the medium itself. The medium neutralizes and
dematerializes itself, giving the illusion of immediacy and immateriality through
mediation. Apparently, it is exactly this inherent transparency of the medium, its
diaphanous quality—crucial to the aisthetic process it enables—that was neglected (in
fact taken advantage of) in order for the mediating process to succeed. Transparency
is used as functional means to an operative end. This conception of medium as
attending to external forces became apparent with the discovery of invisible forces
like electricity, magnetism, and gravity in the late 17th century, impregnating the
medium with magical, occult, or esoteric powers in the 19th century (tele-phone, television, tele-pathy). The primary modality of a medium thus understood is
transmission, be it a message, representation, social or technical apparatus of which it
is only a part (from here to there, from the dead to the living, from the past to the
present). A medium is dependent on an outside, allowing for heteronomy to pass
through it. It is that which trans-mits (über-trägt), trans-lates (über-setzt), trans-poses
(über-führt), or even trans-substantiates (um-wandelt). The Latin trans, the Greek meta,
and the German über indicate not only a movement of crossing (through and across)
but also of ascending (over and beyond). This is a point that is not noted enough: every
instance of transfer carries with it a moment of transcendence. With the connecting
force there is also a leap over an abyss, from one state of matter to another: sound
waves transform into grooves, light waves etch the celluloid, ink turns into words,
electric pulses into data.
Apparently, there is no consensus about the nature of media, whether
understood as mass media or more elaborately as language, image, infrastructure, or
some form of hybrid entities like quasi-objects. And even its relation or difference to
the symbol, imagination, representation, or thing remains an issue when the medium
is taken as an intermediary between the symbolized and the symbol, between
imagination and representation, and so on. What we want to suggest here is
differentiating between two modalities of approach to media: between understanding
media—which might typically fall under the category of media theory—and
questioning media, that is, questioning the very logic by which media are theorized—
2

Aristotle, De Anima, or about the Soul (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2022), 418b; Thomas
Aquinas, Sentencia libri ›De anima‹ (Rome: Commissio Leonina [et al.], 1984), 131-32.
3
Stefan Hoffmann, Geschichte des Medienbegriffs (Hamburg: Meiner, 2002).
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a modality we propose to consider as media philosophy. While the Ancient Greek
theoria indicates a distancing from the world by looking at it, leading to
objectification, science, technology, and apparatus, a media philosophy attempts to
opt out of this tendency to objectify. We therefore suggest that staying with the
question of how to approach media—indeed insisting on it—is what distinguishes
media philosophy from media theory. This will necessarily have implications for how
to address the distinction between mediation and mediality.
In rethinking mediation, we find not only horizontal connection between
previously separate domains, but also vertical connection with elements or forces
presiding above or below. In German idealist philosophy, to mediate means
reconciliation between God and Man, Spirit and World, Idea and Object, Subject and
Object. As said, for Hegel, Vermittlung (mediation) describes a climactic process by
which every step needs to be mediated with the next higher order.4 Here we find builtin teleological verticality within mediation, aiming at the constitution of
consciousness and reason up to an absolute knowledge by way of reconciliation. Marx
famously turned Hegel on his head while nevertheless retaining the process of
Vermittlung, but redefining it materialistically to include power, technology, and
labor. Although reversed, Marxist mediation is no less vertical and teleological than
the Hegelian: if the latter strives upwards, the former goes downwards to the
infrastructure and the underlying conditions.
Another version of downwards-going verticality is that of Innis and
McLuhan.5 Here media are understood as the conditions for human experience,
knowledge, and social relations. Media dematerialize themselves through their
operation, which is necessarily materially rooted. In the 1980s, discussions on the
“materialities of communication”6 picked up from this point, shifting it more radically
towards what Friedrich Kittler called “technological a priori.”7 Operations, formal
algorithms, and hardware make up the foundations of thinking (regardless of its being
human or not). This approach can be traced back not only to McLuhan but also to

4

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 659.
5
Harold A. Innis, Empire & Communications, ed. David Godfrey (Victoria, BC: Press Porcépic, 1986);
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, ed. W. Terence Gordon (Berkeley,
CA: Gingko Press, 2011).
6
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Karl Ludwig Pfeiffer, ed., Materialities of Communication, trans. William
Whobrey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
7
Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 117.
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Foucauldian discourse analysis,8 which itself traces back to Heidegger’s fundamental
ontology, specifically the modality of “readiness-to-hand” or “handiness” (Zuhandenheit),9
and possibly even further back to Nietzsche (who famously stated in a letter to his
assistant: “Our writing tools are also working on our thoughts.”10). On the basis of this
technical conditioning, Kittler provides his triad of mediation—transmission,
processing, and storage—which characterizes much of the thinking today in media
theory. Such a generic understanding of media knows no outside of media. According
to Kittler, history is technologically driven—that is, the result of technological
mediation—and in this respect, his stance is not as far from Hegel’s as he would make
us believe. But if everything comes from media, how is it that media came to exist in
the first place? What happened to Aristotle’s notion of metaxy? It seems that
techniques and technology took over its aisthetic dimension.
The implicit verticality of mediation, whether idealistic or materialistic,
ascending or descending, calls for further unpacking. As is evident from our lost-intranslation incident, there is another way to approach mediation: that of mediality.
Like mediation, mediality is in between, in the middle, and therefore takes place
where the etymology of medium indicates. Also, like mediation, it is a relational
concept and a conditioning factor. But there are also fundamental differences: insofar
as it indicates what is transpiring profoundly in the in-between, mediality entails
rejecting any media a priori, any predetermined middle. If mediality is neither transsubstantial nor reconciliatory nor a priori, what is it left with? Perhaps with the
question itself: for mediality problematizes the very interplay between relata and their
relation, their mutual formative influence, and their recursiveness. At issue are the
multiple conditioning factors, apparatuses, practices, and social integration that come
together to constitute the in-between. In other words, the mutual generative
constitution of something else, a third, a hybrid, through the process of mediation.
Concepts like entanglement, loose or tight coupling, and plasticity all articulate forms
of mediality in and through different media.

8

Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan
Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).
9
In their translation of Being and Time from 1962, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson coin the
term “readiness-to-hand,” while a recent translation by Joan Stambaugh translates Zuhandenheit as
“handiness.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 98; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2010), 65.
10
Quoted in Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 210; Friedrich Nietzsche, “Brief an Peter Gast, Feb.
1882,” in Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. III.1, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2002), 172.
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Mediality in this sense relates to the flat ontology of the mutual emergence of
medial processes, relations and relata, together with their reciprocal effects. If
mediality expresses local formations that, while having their root in material reality,
are nevertheless self-determining, then the following questions arise: How to describe
mediality and its relation to media once we accede there is no predetermined
epistemological model for such an analysis to begin with? We thus enter a state of
suspension, for the distinction between mediation (understood as Vermittlung) and
mediality (understood as Medialität) we are trying to sketch here is not merely
terminological. It entails a gestalt shift between two different modes of approaching
media. Media theory that subscribes to media a priori of various strands (media
archeology, cultural techniques, media genealogy), runs the risk of producing the
concepts of analysis in terms of the media analyzed, the triad of storage, processing,
and transmission being a paradigmatic case. Like the quantum physicist, the media
scholar gets different results depending on the instruments at work. An alternative
media theory would advocate for intermediality whereby one medium is approached
through another in order to gain insight into its logic and effects. While this allows
for a horizontal relation between one medium and another, with a reciprocal
reflection, it is still limited in its purview because the observed medium is necessarily
conditioned by the observing medium. What remains is circular regress. If there is
justification for a media philosophy, it is to be found here: rather than opting for a
theoretical trajectory of an adaequatio intellectus et rei, media philosophy stays with the
question of mediation and mediality and insists on re-invoking it. Thinking in this
sense does not end up in appropriating reality, but in performing the doing and
undoing of appropriation—with no other end than performativity itself.
An important perspective to consider here is Dieter Mersch’s negative media
theory. According to Mersch, the withdrawal of the medium, that it becomes invisible
through its operation, is true not only for the process of mediation but also for
mediality.11 This point would probably also be acceptable to media philosopher Sybille
Krämer, yet the two thinkers differ in the consequences they draw from this
observation. While Krämer uses mediality to elucidate the messenger model insofar
as it mediates what exists outside the process of transmission, for Mersch, this outside
is the starting point to think mediality in the first place, which has consequences not
only for whatever mediality might mean but also for how to do media philosophy. For
Mersch, this withdrawal marks an originary difference within the medium, which
leads to the suspension of mediation as transmission and suggests instead a
performative stance: here and now something takes place that was not before. And
11

Dieter Mersch, “Tertium Datur: Introduction to a Negative Media Theory,” matrizes 7, no. 1
(January/June 2013): 218.
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the effects of this process may potentially also affect the medium itself. This is radical
performativity: it is about singular, unrepeatable instantiations, setting in motion
chains of events. What is emphasized here is “dia-mediality”: the horizontal dia (across
and through) instead of the trans and meta (over and beyond).12 It is about responsivity
rather than intentionality, attending to irrevocable alterity. That which is typically
neglected, forgotten, put aside, or exploited, is put front and center—while still
escaping direct grasp. Any knowledge about mediality, circuitous as it necessarily is,
only takes place within the medium itself, in its operations and practices. Insisting on
tensions, paradoxes, and incongruences is not a capricious whim, but a fundamental
epistemological concern. A different approach to media is at work here, one that is at
odds with the messenger model and its transmission function.13
Although we posit mediation and mediality in opposition for the sake of the
argument, the two modalities are in fact intertwined. Mediality is implicit in
mediation while remaining largely unrecognized, latent, or made invisible by the
wonders of technical functionality. Yet mediation is nevertheless needed in every
discourse on mediality, including the one attempted at this very moment: something
must work, function, and operate in order for the process to be perceivable and
recognizable. Absolute negativity is impossible while absolute functionality is
frightening.
If there is a hypothesis that we intend to venture here, it’s this: media theory
and media philosophy not only follow different paths, but the latter also leads to
resistance against the exploitation of media and mediation by means of technological
operations. Media philosophy itself is a performative act, an intervention—and as
such, de-ontologizes both media and media theory.
A common piece of wisdom in media studies is that media become visible
when they malfunction, thereupon making their operation evident precisely by virtue
of failing to operate. But instead of taking dysfunctionality as the final word in
attempting to understand media, we might pose yet again the question of mediality,
yet in a way that resists setting an opposition between “meta-mediality” and “diamediality.” While transmission seems to obliterate alterity through its operational
processes, traces of incompletion nevertheless persist. Every act of transmission is a
feat against various disruptions along its trajectory. Every act of transmission
therefore involves a leap from one state of matter to the other, a media sublimation
as it were, which is simultaneously an accomplishment of mediation and a
12

Dieter Mersch, “Meta/dia two different approaches to the medial,” Cultural Studies 30, no. 4 (2016):
665.
13
Sybille Krämer, Medium, Messenger, Transmission: An Approach to Media Philosophy (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2015).
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relinquishment of mediality. Verticality is achieved at the expense of horizontality,
which demands its own verticality—that is, its own mediation—in order to be
approached as such. Deference and suspension require a call for resumption; their
announcement depends on mediation, in fact, parasitizes on it.
Neither functionality nor dysfunctionality, neither message nor noise, the
thought suggested here is a form of parasitism. Its image is that of ambiguity itself, a
Kippfigur that does not separate mediation and mediality but rather contains both
simultaneously. As Michel Serres emphasized, parasitism presents a form of alterity
prior to the distinction of same and other, prior to any economic production and
exchange.14 Highlighting such impure mediality invokes thirdness that insists not only
on a tertium datur, but on different varieties of otherness.15
If such thirdness is linked to mediality, attending to it calls for a different
ontology—indeed for undoing ontology. If it were to be described in spatial and
temporal terms, these would be such that unsettle manifest coordinates of time and
space. If it were to be distinguished from the verticality of mediation, its orientation
would be that of inclination.16 Mediality is not simply “there,” but always already at
work. Its effects are to be gleaned rather than captured; its consequences to be invited
rather than anticipated. If mediation comes to pass through relation and relata,
mediality spills sideways, extending to peripheries, internal and external. This
originary imbalance gives rise to dynamism and constant unsettlement. Perhaps the
initial question of media does not demand an answer but is already a form of
answering insofar as it insists on the question and on the inclination animating it.

This essay was supported by a Minerva Fellowship of the Minerva Stiftung
Gesellschaft fuer die Forschung mbH.

14

Michel Serres, The Parasite, trans. Lawrence R. Schehr (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1982).
15
Christopher Watkin, “Not More of the Same: Michel Serres’s Challenge to the Ethics of Alterity,”
Philosophy Today 63, no. 2 (2019): 513–533.
16
Adriana Cavarero, Inclinations: A Critique of Rectitude, trans. Amanda Minervini and Adam Sitze
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).
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